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Congress over the years has debated the merits of having the Defense 
Commissary Agency (DeCA) operate commissaries. In 1997, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) produced a study that evaluated the costs and benefits of 
retail activities, exchanges and commissaries, at military bases and recommended 
four alternatives for Department of Defense (DoD) to consider for improving 
operation of its retail activities. This thesis examines the feasibility of an additional 
alternative: to replace Continental United States (CONUS) commissaries by 
subsidizing commercial supermarkets for discounts provided to eligible service-
members. To evaluate the feasibility of this alternative, the potential funding 
available was compared to the potential costs. The potential funding would come 
from the reduction in DeCA's annual appropriation resulting from eliminating 
CONUS commissaries. The potential costs include the cost of subsidization. 
Estimates of subsidization costs were based on data for grocery expenditures, 
range of family sizes, amount of discount offered to eligible service-members, and 
the portion of the discount subsidized by the government. The analysis reveals that 
the feasibility of this alternative depends significantly on the subsidy policies DoD 
may choose to adopt. 
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The central purpose of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
is to conduct effective military operations in pursuit of 
America's National Security Strategy. In order to accomplish 
this purpose, DoD should concentrate on its core missions, 
outsource activities that can be performed more efficiently 
in the private sector, and reengineer support activities 
that remain in the government. 
DoD, faced with constrained budgetary resources, is 
reducing its infrastructure to free funds to replace aging 
weapon systems. DoD's operation of on base retail 
activities, mainly the Commissaries and Exchanges, is one 
area receiving close scrutiny. The fact that the 
Commissaries receive approximately one billion dollars in 
appropriated funds each year ensures a continuous debate in 
Congress over their operation by DoD. 
~ 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a study 
in October of 1997 that analyzed "The Costs and Benefits of 
Retail Activities at Military Bases. " The CBO Study 
described four potential alternatives: 
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Alternative #1: FO]] OW DoD's Current pJ an 
DoD is planning to maintain the size, scope, and 
pricing policies of its Commissaries while reducing the cost 
of operating them. This would be accomplished by pursuing 
waivers and legislation that would free the commissaries 
from some of the legal and policy constraints that limit 
their ability to control costs. One of the key points is 
that the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) employees are 
members of the federal civil service. This makes the 
employees subject to the civil service rules on hiring, pay, 
promotion, and retirement. The result is that the employees, 
many of whom are cashiers, receive salaries that are 
approximately one and a half times higher than their 
commercial counterparts. Easing these constraints would 
allow the commissaries to operate more like nonappropriated-
fund (NAF) activities. 
Alternative #2:Create a DoD Resale Allthorjty 
The second alternative is to combine DeCA and the 
Exchange systems into a single NAF-like organization called 
the Resale Authority. The combined Resale Authority would 
provide DoD savings by sharing distribution, warehouse, 
transportation, personnel, and information systems. This 
alternative could eliminate the need for appropriations if 
the Resale Authority charged Exchange prices for all of its 
2 
goods. Charging the higher Exchange prices on Commissary 
goods would reduce the nonpay benefits service-members 
currently receive from the Commissaries. 
Alternative #3:Rely on private CQntractors 
This al ternati ve would require DoD to use contractors 
for all on-base retail activities (Commissaries and 
Exchanges). Contracting out retail activities would allow 
DoD to concentrate on its core missions instead of the 
retail business, free DeCA from civil service constraints, 
and introduce competition that could have a dramatic effect 
on costs. 
Alternative #4:Revise Incentives fQr DQD'S Retail Activities 
This alternative would require DoD to pay the full cost 
of its in-house retail activities, including taxes and 
return on capital. Facing the full cost of its retail 
program, DoD would most likely limit the size and scope of 
its retail system to the point where the costs of additional 
activities were balanced by the benefits provided. 
The CBO Study emphasized the need to improve DoD's 
retail operations. The alternatives presented in the CBO 
Study are not an exhaustive list. 
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B. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE 
Another alternative for consideration is closing all 
the commissaries in the Continental United States (CONUS), 
except at isolated bases (i. e. no commercial supermarkets 
nearby), and entering into agreements with the local 
commercial supermarkets to provide discounts to eligible 
service-members. The agreements reached with the 
supermarkets could range from no subsidization to a dollar-
for-dollar subsidization by the government on the discount 
service-members receive. If the government were to subsidize 
the discounts offered by the supermarkets, DoD would have 
the option of limiting the total amount of savings each 
individual could receive. Also, due to the more extensive 
range of products that supermarkets offer compared to the 
commissaries, DoD could limit the range of products that 
would be eligible for the discount. Consideration could also 
be given to limit the subsidization to basic essentials like 
milk, eggs, and cereals. 
Current "Smart Card" technology available at 
supermarkets, like Lucky and Safeway, provides a convenient 
means to track and record the total savings received on an 
individual basis. Before this alternative could be adopted, 
it must provide substantial savings to the government and 
provide an acceptable alternative to the eligible members. 
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C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will evaluate the feasibility of 
contracting with commercial supermarkets to provide 
discounts to eligible service-members. This objective will 
be accomplished by: 
• Examining the willingness of commercial supermarkets 
to offer this type of service. 
• Evaluating the applicability of current "Smart Card" 
technology in use at commercial supermarkets. 
• Analyzing methods to control the amount of 
subsidization. 
~ Comparing estimated costs to current appropriations. 
• Discussing the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of this alternative. 
This research will draw on the Smart Base pilot project 
in Pascagoula, Mississippi. The experiment uses local 
supermarkets to offer a discount to eligible service 
members. The background, arrangements, and results of the 
Smart Base test will be discussed. 
Chapter II will provide a history of the Commissaries, 
describing their evolution from a sutler system to today's 
military grocery store. The origins and organizational 
structure of DeCA will be described as well. 
Chapter III will examine commercial supermarkets. The 
Commissaries and commercial supermarkets will be compared. 
The pilot project at Naval Station Pascagoula will be used 
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as a baseline to demonstrate the willingness of commercial 
supermarkets to enter into this type of agreement. 
Chapter IV will evaluate the scope of subsidization 
that this al ternati ve could create. The concept of 
" selective subsidization" will be defined and a potential 
implementation method discussed. A model will be developed 
to compare potential costs against DeCA' s current annual 
appropriations. The development of "Smart Card" technology 
to support this alternative will be briefly evaluated. 
Chapter V will examine DoD's potential advantages and 
disadvantages from this al ternati ve. DeCA' s rationale for 
keeping the commissaries will be discussed and debated. 
Chapter VI will summarize the results of this thesis. 
Areas that will require more detailed analY$is will be 
discussed. 
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II. HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSARY 
A. HISTORY 
1. Beginnings to World War II 
Although the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) was only 
established in 1990, its mission dates back to the American 
Revolution. With the formation of the Continental Army, 
Congress established a Commissary General of Stores and 
Provisions to provide for the Army's subsistence. This 
system contracted with civilian suppliers to deliver and 
distribute provisions to the Army. The failure of this 
policy was responsible for the nearly disastrous winters at 
Valley Forge and Morristown. [Ref.1:p.80] 
In 1791, government officials and military commanders 
issued licenses to sutlers (civilian merchants) to sell non-
ration items to the troops. These sutlers quickly developed 
a reputation for selling the troops inferior goods at 
exorbitant prices. By 1826, the Army. sold goods from 
commissary storehouses directly to officers posted at 
specific locations, particularly remote posts. These goods 
were sold to the officers at wholesale prices plus 
transportation costs. In 1835, Congress made the Subsistence 
Department permanent. Six years later, the Army allowed the 
officers to purchase these goods for their 
families. [Ref.1:p.80] 
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On July 28, 1866, Congress passed legislation that 
abolished sutlers and allowed both officers and enlisted to 
purchase goods at cost from the commissary storehouses. This 
legislation did not restrict the geographical location of 
the stores. Specifically, it did not limit this practice to 
remote posts. On July 1, 1867, the first sales commissary 
began operating at Fort Delaware, DE. Shortly after, all the 
Army subsistence warehouses doubled as sales commissaries. 
[Ref.2:p.7] 
In 1879, Congress legislated a ten percent surcharge on 
all commissary items, except tobacco, to help pay for 
spoilage and transportation costs. The ten-percent surcharge 
only stayed in effect for five years. This same legislation 
also authorized retired officers, who received permission 
from the local commander, to purchase goods at cost from the 
sales commissaries. Later in 1879, this privilege was also 
extended to civilian Army employees at remote posts. The 
only stipulation was that the civilians had to pay cash for 
their purchases. In 1881, Army regulations expanded this 
privilege to family members. The regulations stated that an 
Army officer could designate a family member to make 
subsistence purchases during his absence. [Ref.2:p.9] 
The expansion of the sales commissaries overseas was 
initiated by the acquisition of overseas territory during 
the Spanish-American War. On April 9, 1898, an overseas 
grocery list was established for the sales commissaries. On 
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October 1, 1900, the first 
commissary was established at 
Islands. [Ref.2:p.9] 
permanent overseas sales 
Manila in the Phillipine 
In 1908, the Navy's canteen system and "Bum boats" 
(similar to the Army's sutlers) were proven inadequate by 
the voyages of the "Great White Fleet. " The Naval 
Appropriations Act of 1909 provided for Navy Ships' Stores 
and Commissaries and Marine Corp Commissaries. The first 
Marine Corp Commissary was established in 1909. The 
following year, the first Navy Commissary was established at 
the Washington, D.C., Navy Yard. [Ref.2:pp.9,10] 
The Appropriations Act of 1916, referring back to the 
earlier Army Regulation, permitted the sale of commissary 
supplies to active duty or retired enlisted personnel. In 
1926, the Army allowed officers, warrant officers, and 
enlisted members of the Officers Reserve Corps, Enlisted 
Reserve Corps, National Guard, and National Guard Reserve to 
purchase goods at Commissaries while they were attending 
service schools, while on maneuvers with the regular Army, 
and while in a camp at a station were such sales were being 
made. Purchases were only allowed for eligible personnel and 
their immediate family. This privilege was also extended to 
lighthouse keepers and crews of lightships. In 1937, the 
Navy extended commissary privileges to both officers and 
enlisted men of the Coast Guard and to the widows of Navy, 
Marine Corp, and Coast Guard officers and enlisted men. In 
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1938, the concept of "self-service" operations was 
introduced in commissaries. [Ref.1:pp.80,81] 
2. World War II to Establishment of DeCA 
The commissaries underwent unprecedented growth along 
with the growth of the services during World War II. The 
commissaries and exchanges often shared facilities during 
the war. This overlap led to confusion about their different 
functions and soon they were referred to as one and the 
same. [Ref.1:p.81] 
The growth of the commissaries and exchanges also 
brought closer scrutiny from Congress. In 1949, the House of 
Representatives established the House Armed Service 
Committee's Special Subcommittee on Resale Activities of the 
Armed Forces (also referred to as the Special Subcommittee 
on Exchanges and Commissaries, or the Philbin Committee). 
The Subcommittee's role was to investigate Post Exchanges, 
Quartermaster Sales Stores, Ship's Service Stores, 
Commissaries, and other pertinent or related activities 
within the Armed Forces. [Ref.2:p.13] 
The Subcommittee's report concluded the following: 
• that commissaries and 
unfairly competing 
business, 
exchanges were actively and 
with established private 
• that many commissaries were being operated in close 
proximity to adequate commercial facilities which 
were conveniently available at reasonable prices, 
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• that it would be desirable to have constant 
regulations governing exchange and commissary 
activities, since wide variation existed in current 
regulations, and 
• there was inequity between the 
who was eligible to shop 
commissaries. [Ref.2:p.14] 
services concerning 
at exchanges and 
The subcommittee singled out the exchanges for most of 
its criticisms. They recommended that the price differential 
between the exchanges and retail businesses be narrowed by 
including in the cost of the exchange operations all 
utilities, maintenance, and equipment. The Subcommittee also 
recommended that all services refer to their service stores 
and exchanges as "exchanges," that regulations be 
standardized, and that the exchanges generate profits for 
recreation and welfare funds. [Ref.2:p.14] 
The Subcommittee did not believe that the primary 
purpose of the exchanges was to generate profits for the 
recreation and welfare fund. Rather, the Subcommittee's 
report made it very clear that the sole justification for 
maintaining and operating exchanges and commissaries was the 
convenience and morale of military members and their 
families. [Ref.2:p15] 
On October I, 1949, as a result of the Subcommittee's 
recommendations, the Armed Services Commissary Store 
Regulation (ASCSR) was instituted. The ASCSR standardized 
the stock list, terminology, and other criteria for all of 
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the Armed Services' commissaries. The ASCSR also specified 
the qualifications for eligible commissary patrons. The 
regulation also specified that commissaries would not be 
authorized in areas where adequate commercial facilities 
were conveniently available and sold commissary merchandise 
at reasonable prices. The terms "conveniently located" and 
"reasonably priced" were, and continue to be, open to 
interpretation. [Ref.2:p.15] 
With' the FY 1952 Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, Congress required commissaries to become self-
sustaining in purchasing and maintaining equipment and 
supplies. To do this, Congress established a surcharge on 
goods sold at commissaries, initially set at two percent, to 
commence on 1 January 1952. The surcharge paid for operating 
equipment, supplies, utilities, merchandise losses and 
spoilage. The commissary customers were responsible for 
paying the cost of the merchandise (purchase price plus 
transportation costs). The remaining costs not paid for by 
the customer or the surcharge were borne by the military 
departments. These costs included pay and allowances for 
employees, facilities (including store rental), procurement, 
inspection, receiving, warehousing, disbursing, accounting, 
and other administrative functions. [Ref.2:pp.15,16] 
In 1963, excess surcharge funds were authorized to be 
used for construction and remodeling costs. These costs now 
comprise the second largest share of the surcharge 
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collection at 29%. The largest share goes toward operating 
expenses, followed by construction, automated data 
processing 
[Ref.2:p.19] 
(ADP) systems, utilities, and equipment. 
The surcharge rates continued to increase over the 
years, with the specific rates varying by service. In 1974, 
Congress increased the surcharge to three percent. In 1976, 
the Navy and Marine Corps used a variable surcharge rate 
that averaged six percent. At the same time, the Army and 
Air Force surcharge rates were four percent. In 1983, the 
Secretary of Defense put an end to the variation in 
surcharge rates between the services by setting the rate at 
five percent. [Ref.1:p.82] 
The issues of privatization, competition, and true 
costs have been reviewed by different commissions during a 
40-year period starting in 1956. Yet, there were no major 
changes to the foundation for today's commissaries, that was 
laid in 1952, until the services' commissary systems were 
consolidated on the recommendation of the Jones Commission 
in 1989. [Ref.1:p.82] 
This recommendation had been previously forwarded in a 
DoD Comptroller General Study to improve commissary 
operations. A 1980 General Accounting Office (GAO) report 
also recommended consolidating the service commissary 
systems into a single agency. [Ref.1:p.82] 
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3. Establishment of DeCA to Present 
On May IS, 1990, DoD announced the Defense Commissary 
Agency would be formed to consolidate the services' 
commissary systems. To assist in the transition, a DeCA 
transition team was established in July 1990. One of the 
first actions of this team was to select Fort Lee, VA as the 
site for the new headquarters. On November 9, 1990, DeCA was 
established by DoD Directive 5105.55. On October I, 1991, 
DeCA was officially activated; Army Major General John 
Dreska was named the first director. [Ref.1:p.83] 
DeCA's first ma'j or problem, due to consolidation into 
one agency, was its bill paying system. In the winter of 
1991-92, this problem ballooned to $403 million of unpaid 
bills. Making this problem a short-term priority, the 
. backlog of unpaid bills was down to $33 million by November 
1992. At that point, DeCA' s Director declared the problem 
solved and under control. [Ref.1:p.83] 
On November 30, 1992, Army Major General Richard E. 
Beale, Jr. became the new DeCA Director. Since his tenure 
began, DeCA's headquarters has been reorganized and the 
number of military employees has been significantly reduced. 
In December 1995, DeCA received the Hammer Award, 
recognizing the agency for significantly reinventing 
government processes. [Ref.1:p.83] 
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On December 5, 1995, the Defense Science Board 
contracted with Coopers & Librand to conduct a "broad brush" 
study on privatizing the commissaries. This study 
recommended that the commissaries be privatized. On December 
21, DeCA's director briefed the Defense Science Board about 
the agency's stand on privatizing the commissaries by making 
the following points: [Ref.4iPp.40-41] 
• DeCA had already privatized many functions. 
• DeCA had accomplished a great deal without total 
privatization. 
• DeCA was the clear leader, when compared to civilian 
supermarkets, in customer savings and reducing 
costs. 
The privatization issue continued to gain momentum. On 
January 24, 1996, the chairman of the House Budget 
Committee, Rep. John Kasich (R-Ohio), asked the CBO to 
conduct a "comprehensive review of nonappropriated fund and 
resale activities by the DoD." Specifically, Mr. Kasich 
wanted CBO to address costs, benef its, and whether there 
were "less costly alternatives" to the existing system that 
could "provide the same level of benefit." [Ref.4ip.41] 
In March 1996, DeCA was one of several government 
agencies nominated to become a performance-based 
organization (PBO) as part of Vice President Gore's effort 
to reinvent government. On October I, DeCA officially became 
the only transitional PBO agency in DoD. [Ref.4ip.43] 
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On October 29, 1997, DeCA, the Army and Air Force 
Exchange Service, and the Navy Exchange Command signed a 
memorandum of agreement to raise the price of cigarettes 
sold in the commissaries by 20-30 percent. On November 1, a 
DoD directive mandated that DeCA sell cigarettes at exchange 
prices. This policy only affected bases where commissaries 
already sold cigarettes. [Ref.4ip.43] 
B. DECA ORGANIZATION 
DeCA oversees the operation of the worldwide commissary 
system from its headquarters in Fort Lee, VA. To manage and 
operate the 298 commissaries worldwide, DeCA employs 17,000 
people. DeCA I s total sales in FY 1997 were $5.1 billion, 
making it the ninth largest grocery chain in the United 
States. [Ref.3:p.1] 
Figure 2.1 shows DeCA I s current organizational chart. 
The Command Section directs all of DeCAls activities. The 
Command Section includes the Director (normally a two-star 
general officer), Chief Executive Officer, Chief of Staff, 
Aide-de-Camp, Senior Enlisted Advisor, and all 
administrative support. DeCA falls under the Undersecretary 
of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). [Ref.1:p.5] 
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There are currently six Functional Directorates. The 
Directorate of Facilities develops and implements facilities 
policies and programs. The Resource Management Directorate 
develops policy, procedures, and plans for commissary 
financial and accounting matters, administers funding 
authority, analyzes financial reports, and ensures the 
fiscal accounts' integrity. The Directorate of Operations 
develops, establishes, directs and implements the 
commissaries' operating policies, procedures, and programs. 
The Personnel and Training Directorate plans and directs 
civilian and military training and development programs for 
the agency. The Directorate of Information Resource 
Management provides program management, planning, and 
support for automation, telecommunications, and other 
automation-related functions that speed the flow of 
information among decision-makers. The Acquisition 
Management Directorate manages DeCA's worldwide acquisition 
program for procuring commissary resale items, operational 
equipment, supplies and services, and agency support 
requirements. [Ref.l: pp. 5,6] 
The Operations Support Center responds to the 
operational and support needs of the agency's regions, zone 
managers, commissaries, and other associated facilities 
worldwide. 
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This worldwide commissary system is divided into four 
regions. Figure 2.2 shows DeCA's regions. The regional 
headquarters provide technical advice, assistance, training 
and direction to commissaries located in their regions. 
Regional Directors report directly to DeCA's CEO. The 
regions are divided into zones and districts for localized 
management support. Zone managers report to their respective 
regions. Stores work directly thrQugh zone managers within 
their regions, or through the Operations Support 
Center. [Ref.1:p.6] 
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Figure 2.2. Defense Commissary Agency Regions 
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c. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a brief history of the 
commissaries and their consolidation under the cognizance of 
the Defense Commissary Agency. Commissaries have evolved 
from commissary sales stores, which were little more than 
warehouses with a table or counter, to the modern grocery 
stores of today. 
Chapter III will examine the commercial supermarket 
industry. Commissaries and commercial supermarkets will be 
compared. The Pilot Project at Naval Station Pascagoula will 
be discussed and used to illustrate the willingness of 
commercial 
discount. 




III. COMMERCIAL SUPERMARKETS 
This chapter will briefly examine the grocery 
industry's development from specialized stores to today' s 
supermarkets. It will describe the fierce competition in the 
grocery industry. Competition requires grocery stores to 
operate efficiently and provide other conveniences to 
attract customers. Then the commissaries and supermarkets 
will be compared to illustrate key differences. Lastly, the 
pilot project at the Naval Station Pascagoula will be 
described. Several observations from the pilot project that 
concern the discount required to maintain service -members 
utility will be discussed. 
A. SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
Early food stores typically specialized in one type of 
item. Customers would often stroll down Main Street and 
purchase produce at one store and meat at another. By the 
1930's, the concept of value and variety under one roof had 
become well established. Kroger, the number one United 
States supermarket chain today, started in 1883 and grew to 
forty stores by 1902. [Ref. S:p .1] Now supermarkets not only 
offer over 22,000 different items to their customers, but 
they also provide a variety of "convenience" services inside 
their stores, from banking to driver's license tag renewal. 
Although the grocery industry operates on some of the 
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smallest profit margins, typically around one percent, the 
127,000 United States grocers had retail sales of $436 
billion in 1997. [Ref.6:p.3] 
Grocery stores are retail stores that sell a line of 
dry groceries, canned goods, nonfood items, and perishable 
items. In contrast, a supermarket is a large, self-service 
grocery store with full product lines and at least 2 million 
dollars in annual sales. Supermarkets, such as Lucky, 
Safeway, Kroger, and Albertson's, have become common 
household names. Presently, supermarkets represent less than 
twenty-five percent of all the grocery stores but account 
for almost seventy-five percent of total grocery sales. 
Supermarket chains (eleven or more locations) contribute 
nearly sixty percent of the total sales. [Ref.6:p.4] The rise 
of these large, national chains, along with the expansion of 
the convenience stores, has absorbed or pushed out many of 
the mom-and-pop grocery stores. 
Membership warehouse clubs, such as Costco and Wal-
Mart's Sam's Club, are another growing segment of the 
grocery industry. These warehouse clubs offer items in bulk, 
typically at discount prices. 
Grocery retailers not only compete against one 
another, but also against retail supercenters, like Wal-
Mart, that continue to add grocery sections to their stores. 
As a counter to this attack, grocers have built up the 
nonfood sections of their stores, adding housewares and 
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other general merchandise. Food retailers are also selling 
fully prepared meals in an attempt to take business away 
from the restaurant industry. 
Food retailers work closely with grocery wholesalers. 
Wholesalers buy both branded and private-label food and 
general merchandise from manufacturers and distribute these 
products to stores. As the larger grocers continue to strike 
more deals directly with food manufacturers, wholesalers are 
striving to cut costs and improve' distribution efficiency. 
Many wholesale distributors also supply and operate their 
own retail outlets to increase their returns. 
To combat their paper-thin margins, manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers work closely together to 
determine the most efficient and profitable product 
assortment within each category. This analysis, referred to 
as "category management," has led grocers to expand and 
improve their produce departments and private-label 
selections to attain higher profits. 
B. COMPARISON OF SUPERMARKETS AND COMMISSARIES 
1. Competition 
The supermarket industry in the United States is 
fiercely competitive. 
efficiently as possible 
their very small profit 
attract customers and 
Supermarkets must operate 










convenient locations, long operating hours, and customer 
service, as much as on price. Supermarkets offer alternative 
store formats that provide both food and general retail 
merchandise (convenience stores, warehouse stores, and 
hypermarts). Supermarkets have the advantage of using "loss 
leaders" and "swing buyers." Loss leaders are products that 
are intentionally sold at a loss to attract customers. Swing 
buyers are purchasers who change brand loyalties to take 
advantage of a sale or promotion. 
On the other hand, commissaries are only located on 
installations where we have a military presence. 
Commissaries do not compete actively with each other, or the 
local supermarkets, but they are in competition by virtue of 
shopper I s behavior. Commissaries are not in the market to 
make a profit and do not solicit customers by advertising 
like the commercial supermarkets do. Also, unlike 
supermarkets, commissaries are restricted by law from using 
loss leaders to attract customers. Commissaries exist solely 
to provide a non-p~y compensation benefit to military 
members, retirees, and their families. [Ref.7:p.l] 
2. Accessibility 
Commercial supermarkets are designed to serve the 
neighborhoods that surround them, typically within a two or 
three mile radius. In contrast, commissaries are designed to 
serve all the eligible personnel within the local area, 
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typically up to a 30 mile radius or more. Even though 
current and former service members value their right to shop 
at the commissaries, use declines with the distance patrons 
must travel. The CBO Report estimated that the average 
household of a retired service member within five miles of a 
commissary accounted for commissary purchases amounting to 
more than four times the dollar value of households located 
between ten and thirty miles from the commissary ($3600 vice 
$850). Commissary patrons cited the proximity of commercial 
supermarkets to their home as the most important reason they 
did not rely solely on commissaries. [Ref.8:p.ll] 
The next most important reason why patrons don't shop 
at commissaries is the accessibility provided by the longer 
operating hours at commercial supermarkets. A commissary 
sets operating hours based upon the amount of appropriated 
funds it receives. Unlike the commercial supermarkets, which 
usually operate long hours to increase their profitability, 
commissaries cannot stay open to maximize their sales 
potential. Commissaries' operating hours are set to support 
the optimum mix of hours for the base's demographic 
population. Therefore, high-volume stores, such as the one 
in Fort Bel voir, recei ve more funding for operating hours 
than the smaller volume commissaries. 
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3. Service 
When compared to supermarkets, commissaries typically 
offer shorter hours, more crowded shopping conditions, and a 
more limited selection of merchandise. Presently, Congress 
determines the stock assortment, by major category of 
products, which commissaries are allowed to sell. 
Commissaries are prohibited from selling items such as beer, 
wine or greeting cards. 
As mentioned before, supermarkets frequently offer 
other types of services to attract customers, such as floral 
sales, banking, pharmacies, and photo processing. Even if 
DoD combined its exchange and commissary retail activities 
(one of the alternatives mentioned earlier), its ability to 
offer a range of services 
would still be limited 
comparable to the supermarkets I 
in areas where the military 
population is small. Commissaries, due to their limited size 
and product mix, are unable to offer the same types of 
amenities as supermarkets. 
. The characteristics of commissaries and commercial 
supermarkets are shown in Table 111.1. These characteristics 
are based on data from the April 1997 annual report of 





Hours Open per Week 48 132 
Number of Items Stocked 9,800 23,000 
Conveniences Offered (such 
as banking, photo NO YES 
processing, etc. ) 
Table 111.1. Characteristics of Commissaries and 
Supermarkets. 
C. PILOT PROJECT 
1. Description 
In 1997, The Navy Smart Base Project Office, along with 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) , 
initiated a one year pilot project with the local retail 
industries to voluntarily provide additional benefits to the 
active and retired military personnel located near the Naval 
Station Pascagoula, Mississippi. Service-members normally 
receive savings on retail items by shopping at exchanges and 
commissaries on military bases. However, Naval Station 
Pascagoula is not a traditional military base; it relies on 
the local community for many support services. Specifically, 
the station does not have family housing, childcare, a full 
service exchange, a gas station, or a commissary. The 
nearest commissary is thirty miles away at Keesler Air Force 
Base. As mentioned before, patrons cited the distance from 
commissaries as the main reason they do not rely solely on 
them for groceries. 
29 
This pilot program was designed to allow local military 
personnel to shop near their homes and still receive a 
discount on their food purchases at no cost to the 
government. In order to do this and conform to the Navy's 
initiative and principles for regionalization, the Jackson 
County Chamber of Commerce and the Navy gathered local 
retailers to discuss the Navy's Commissary Benefits Program. 
The goal was to receive comments and suggestions and to 
determine· which retailers would be interested in entering 
into a partnership with the Navy to provide these beneficial 
services. The approach was sold as a win-win scenario for 
the local community. It would provide the estimated ten 
thousand eligible personnel the benefit of discounts and it 
would support participating local retailers by maintaining 
the purchases in the local area. 
2. Current Status 
Presently, two stores have entered the pilot program; 
several others are evaluating it for potential future 
participation. The two participating stores are the Food 
World Supermarket, which offers a five percent discount, and 
Family Frozen Foods, a locally owned store specializing in 
bulk purchasing sizes, which offers a six percent discount. 
The discounts offered by these stores do not match the 
twenty-five to thirty percent savings the commissaries 
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claim, but they do save the members time and provide them a 
reasonable and convenient alternative. 
The Navy is attempting, currently unsuccessfully, to 
persuade Mississippi to waive its seven percent state sales 
tax, which would further augment the discounts offered by 
retail grocers. This would make the aggregate savings twelve 
to thirteen percent for eligible service-members in 
Pascagoula. These higher savings, combined wi th the 
opportunity to "shop at home," as opposed to a sixty mile 
roundtrip to Keesler Air Force Base, would offset the 
additional savings the commissary offers and further entice 
personnel to purchase groceries from the local community. 
3. Conclusions 
The Pilot Project provides service-members near the 
Naval Station Pascagoula a unique situation. These service-
members have the following options when purchasing 
groceries: 
• utilize the commissary at Keesler, which requires a 
one hour round trip 
• utilize the stores participating in the pilot 
project to take advantage of the discounts, or 
• utilize the other stores in the area that they may 
prefer at no discount. 
Which one the service-member chooses will depend on 
which one they perceive provides them the most benefit. This 
perception, or utility, will be affected by factors such as 
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accessibility, service, savings, and personal preferences. 
One possibility is that service-members will utilize the 
participating stores for perishable goods, emergent needs, 
and nonperishable items that are on sale, while the 
commissary will be utilized once or twice a month to stock 
up on nonperishable goods. Another possibility is that 
utility provided by the savings at the participating stores 
versus the distance to the commissary will be such that the 
service-member will shop only at the participating stores or 
vice versa. No data are currently available to measure the 
effect, if any, the pilot project has had on the purchasing 
habits of service-members near Pascagoula; but it will 
become evident in any changes in the sales at Keesler Air 
Force Base commissary. 
The discounts offered by stores will not be the same in 
every location. Stores will evaluate the utility they 
receive prior to determining a discount to offer. The stores 
in the pilot project apparently determined that a five or 
six percent discount was adequate, based on the fact that it 
increased their customer base and that the nearest 
commissary is thirty miles away. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the grocery industry and 
compared it with the commissaries. The background of the 
pilot project at the Naval Station Pascagoula was discussed. 
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The pilot project was used to show the willingness of 
supermarkets to provide discounts to eligible service-
members. 
Chapter IV will evaluate the scope of the subsidization 
that this alternative could create. The. concept of 
" selective subsidization" will be defined and a potential 
method to implement this alternative will be discussed. A 
model will be developed to compare potential costs against 
DeCAls current annual appropriations to determine the 
feasibility of this alternative. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter will evaluate the government's potential 
costs to subsidize all or a portion of discounts offered by 
commercial supermarkets. These costs will be compared to the 
portion of DeCA's annual appropriation that supports 
commissaries in CONUS. The potential to limit the total 
subsidization costs through " selective subsidization" will 
be described. Potential methods to monitor and track the 
Government's total subsidization costs, such as "smart card" 
technology, will be discussed. 
A. ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTION 
The commissary's original function was to provide 
eligible service-members at remote posts access to products 
at a reasonable price. In 1949, the Armed Services 
Commissary Store Regulation (ASCSR) specified that 
commissaries would not be authorized in areas where adequate 
commercial facilities were both conveniently available and 
sold merchandise at reasonable prices. [Ref.2:p.15] With the 
growth of the grocery industry and efficiency born from 
competition, DoD should take a closer look at allowing 
commercial facilities to provide services while DoD focuses 
on its core mission. 
This alternative involves working with local 






and retired, as a replacement for 
This alternative will not apply to 
commissaries at either isolated bases in CONUS or overseas, 
as these provide service members immeasurable benefits at 
those locations. Furthermore, it is unlikely an acceptable 
commercial alternative would be available or willing to take 
over those commissaries. However, most military bases in 
CONUS are located near fairly large cities that have an 
abundance of both independent and chain supermarkets. 
As mentioned before, the grocery industry is very 





customers. Entering into 
opportunity to benefit from 
provide the industry an 
the eleven million eligible 
service-members and their families that currently use the 
commissaries. 
Commissaries currently claim to provide service-members 
a twenty-five to thirty percent savings. [Ref.3:p.l] DeCA 
estimates these savings by using a market basket survey 
approach. This approach involves comparing the price of a 
specific basket of goods in commissaries at a single point 
in time with the average price in nearby supermarkets. 
CBO argues that the market basket survey overlooks the 
fact that customers tend to buy more of an item when it is 
on sale. Customers frequently stock up on nonperishable 
items during sales and adjust their weekly menus to take 
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advantage of specials on meats and produce items. These 
shopping patterns are automatically reflected in industry 
margins but are not captured in a market basket comparison. 
Commissary patrons benefit from the "everyday low prices" 
and can avoid the "cost" of shopping in multiple stores to 
reduce their grocery bills. Therefore, the CBO Report 
estimates that the actual savings the commissary provides 
over commercial prices is only twenty percent. [Ref.9:p.ll] 
Many factors, such as convenience, service, income, 
selection, and proximity, would have to be evaluated to 
determine the discount necessary to ensure service-members 
receive the same non-pay benefit as the commissaries 
provide. However, the evaluation required of these factors 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of 
further analysis, CBO's estimate that the commissaries 
provide twenty percent savings will be used. 
B. NECESSARY LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL FUNDING AVAILABLE 
To limit the scope of the analysis, this thesis will 
only evaluate the cost of providing discounts to active-duty 
personnel, even though the subsidy would apply to all 
eligible service-members. Active-duty personnel have been 
selected because the commissaries were founded to benefit 
this group. Therefore, the feasibility of this alternative 
will depend on whether or not the costs to subsidize the 
purchases of active-duty personnel from commercial 
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supermarkets are less than the current funding DeCA receives 
from Congress. 
1. Selective Subsidization 
Commissaries, unlike commercial supermarkets, do not 
operate to make a profit. In contrast to commercial 
supermarkets, commissaries are subsidized by the government 
via an annual appropriation. The appropriation is used to 
pay for labor, contract services, transportation costs, and 
utilities overseas. This appropriation allows the 
commissaries to offer goods at wholesale cost plus a five 
.perce~t surcharge. The collected surcharge funds are used to 
pay for capital investment, utilities at CONUS stores, and 
to purchase supplies (such as paper bags and cash register 
tapes). The combination of a surcharge and an appropriation 
allows commissaries to operate like a working capital fund 
activity when it sells and buys goods. Commissaries 
essentially receive a dollar-for-dollar return on goods that 
they buy and sell. Limited appropriated funds dictate that 
commissaries operate . shorter hours, offer fewer products, 
and limit eligible patrons to control costs. 
These limitations, inherent in the normal operations 
of the commissaries to control costs, would be eliminated by 
closing CONUS commissaries and relying on commercial 
facilities. Therefore, it might be necessary to create a new 
DoD policy to limit the amount of subsidy the government 
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would provide. The policy to place these limits will be 
referred to as "selective subsidization." 
Selective subsidization will be defined as the 
selection of products authorized for purchase at a discount 
along with the total monthly/annual savings an individual 
can receive. The importance of selective subsidization is 
threefold. 
First, supermarkets would most likely require some form 
of compensation to offer a sufficient discount. Using the 
pilot project as a baseline, it appears that supermarkets 
would be willing to provide a modest discount, approximately 
five percent, at no cost to the government to increase their 
customer base. The exact discount that supermarkets would be 
willing to offer will vary from region to region. In any 
case, a modest discount might be unacceptable to service-
members. Therefore, some form of subsidization from the 
government might be required to increase the discount to an 
acceptable level, around twenty percent for the purposes of 
.this analysis. 
Second, the average supermarket offers over two times 
as many products as the average commissary. This difference 
can be attributed to the fact that Congress limits the 
number and type of products commissaries offer; the limited 
appropriated funds also affect the quantity and diversity of 
sales. Providing a twenty percent discount on all products 
that a supermarket offers could significantly increase DoD's 
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potential subsidization costs. To limit this potential cost 
increase, a policy that limits the discount to products 






savings could cause the 
This could significantly 
increase the subsidization costs, making it necessary to 
place limits on the total savings each individual can 
receive on a monthly/annual basis. The amount each 
individual can save could be based on status (active duty or 
retired), rank, and number of dependents. 
Another potential policy approach would be to allow the 
discount to apply to all items available at supermarkets. 
This approach would most likely allow DoD to reduce the 
discount that service-members would be willing to accept by 
increasing the range of products service-members could 
purchase at this discounted rate. Comparing alternative 
policies and 
beyond the 
their implications for government 
scope of this thesis.· If discounts 
discount 
cQsts is 
through commercial facilities are a viable option, 
examined more alternative 
carefully. 
discount policies should be 
2. Potential Funds for Subsidization 
DeCA receives approximately one billion dollars in 
annual appropriations to operate the 298 commissaries 
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worldwide. In 1997, these commissaries generated $5.1 
billion dollars of sales. The 199 commissaries in CONUS 
accounted for approximately eighty-four percent of total 
sales. The 99 overseas commissaries accounted for the 
remaining sixteen percent of total sales; in contrast, 
overseas commissaries accounted for approximately thirty-
four percent of DeCAls total costs. 
It must be noted that DoD routinely includes the costs 
and sales of seventeen commissaries in CONUS located at 
isolated bases with the total sales and cost figures of the 
overseas commissaries. DoD defines "isolation" in this list 
by using access to recreational facilities rather than 
access to grocery stores. [Ref.9:p.28] In contrast, DeCA only 
identified seven of the CONUS commissaries as being located 
at isolated bases in 1995. DeCAl s isolated commissaries 
reflected areas without a commercial supermarket within ten 
miles. According to the CBO Report, these seven commissaries 
account for only about one-half of one percent of all the 
United States commissary sales. [Ref.9:p.6] 
Using the factors presented, approximately $660 million 
(sixty-six percent) of the one billion dollar appropriations 
is attributable to non-isolated CONUS commissaries and hence 
could be converted for use as subsidization funds. A summary 
of the data used is provided in Table IV.l. 
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Sales Costs 
DeCA $5.1 Billion (100%) $1 Billion (100%) 
CONUS Commissaries $4.3 Billion (84%) $660 Million (66%) 
Overseas $0.8 Billion (16%) $340 Million (34%) 
Commissaries 
Table IV.l. Summary of Commissary Sales and Costs. 
3. Costs Attributable to Active Duty Personnel 
Given that the total costs for the CONUS commissaries 
is $660 million, the next step is to determine the portion 
of costs attributable to CONUS active-duty personnel grocery 
purchases. This will be based on the estimated portion of 
the total commissary sales in CONUS attributable to active 
duty personnel. 
In 1993, the CBO Report estimated that active duty 
personnel accounted for thirty-eight percent of the total 
sales in U. S. commissaries, even though they comprised 
forty- seven percent of the patrons. Figure 4.1 shows the 
1993 distribution of commissary patrons and sales in the 
United States. [Ref.9:p.3] In 1995, based on ch~nges in the 
number of active, retired, and reserve personnel living in 
the United States, CBO estimated that active-duty personnel 
accounted for thirty-six percent of U. S. sales. CBO 
estimated that active-duty personnel would only account for 
thirty-four percent of U. S. commissary sales by the end of 
the decade, based on DoD's projection of the future service-
member populations. [Ref.9:p.4] 
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Active-Duty Retirees Reserves 
• Patrons 
ilSales 
.Figure 4.1. 1993 Distribution of Commissary Patrons and 
Sales in United States (In Percent) . 
DeCA does not normally track sales by type of patron. 
However, DeCA conducted a survey in 1997 to evaluate their 
customer service. The distribution of patrons in this survey 
was very similar to tOhe mix of patrons from the 1993 data 
presented in Figure 4.1. The survey was conducted in 294 
commissaries and received over 38,000 responses. The results 
of the patron mix are summarized in Table IV.2. 
SPONSOR STATUS RESPONSES PERCENT 
Active-Duty 18,252 48% 
Retirees 16,681 43.9% 
Reserve/Guard 1,237 3.3% 
Other 1,840 4.8% 
TOTAL 38,828 100% 
Table IV.2. Summary of Patron Mix from 1997 DeCA Survey. 
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Although this survey was not intended to determine the 
patron sales mix, the mix of patrons that p~rticipated in 
the survey is similar enough to the earlier estimates to 
warrant use. It must be noted that this similarity does not 
mean that patron purchasing habits have not changed. 
However, data are not available that delineate sales by type 
of patron. Thus, the CBO estimate of thirty-four percent 
will be used to determine the portion of the total 
commissary costs attributable to active-duty personnel. 
Based on this assumption, the cost attributable to CONUS 
active-duty personnel is given in Table IV.3. 
Total Commissary Costs $1. 0 Billion 
Total CONUS Commissary Costs $660 Million 
Total CONUS Commissary Cost Attributable $225 Million 
to Active-Duty Personnel 
Table IV.3. Summary of Commissary Costs Attributable to 
Active-Duty Personnel. 
This result provides a target amount of $225 million 
available to subsidize the savings offered by commercial 
supermarkets for purchases made by active-duty personnel in 
CONUS. The next section will evaluate potential costs to the 
government based on subsidizing all products purchased at 
commercial supermarkets. 
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C. ESTIMATION OF SUBSIDIZATION COSTS 
The potential costs of implementing this alternative 
will be based on the total number of eligible personnel and 
their dependents, the amount these consumers spend on 
grocery products per year, and the portion of the 
supermarket discount that requires government compensation. 
The analysis presented here will evaluate the potential 
costs created by active-duty personnel assuming the 
government subsidizes all products they purchase at 
commercial supermarkets. 
1. Number of Active-Duty Personnel in CONUS 
Congress establishes the total number of active-duty 
personnel authorized in the armed forces. Currently, the 
armed forces consist of just over 1. 4 million active-duty 
personnel. This number includes personnel that are stationed 
overseas and routinely deployed overseas. The number of 
active-duty personnel typically deployed overseas is 
approximately 250,000. [Ref.l0:p.21] 
Since this alternative does not eliminate commissaries 
at isolated bases, it is necessary to estimate the number of 
personnel routinely stationed at these bases. However, as 
described above, DoD and DeCA disagree as to what defines an 
isolated base in CONUS; the number of bases is somewhere 
between seven and seventeen. Sales at the seven DeCA 
commissaries accounted for only one-half of one percent of 
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all the United States commissary sales in 1995. [Ref.9:p.S] 
Even if the active-duty personnel at isolated bases 
accounted for one hundred percent of the sales, the total 
number of active-duty personnel at these bases would be 
small. Assuming one-half of one percent of all active-duty 
personnel are stationed at isolated bases would equate to 
approximately 7000 personnel. Based on this fact and for 
conservatism, the number of active-duty personnel stationed 
at isolated bases will be considered negligible for 
calculational purposes. This makes the number of active-duty 
personnel stationed in CONUS approximately 1.15 million. The 
relevant data on the number of active-duty personnel is 
summarized in Table IV.4. 
Total Active-Duty Personnel 1. 4 Million 
Active-Duty Personnel 250,000 
Stationed Overseas 
Active-Duty Personnel 
Stationed in CONUS (except 1.15 Million 
isolated bases) 
Table IV.4. Distribution of Active-Duty Personnel. 
2. Estimation of Active-Duty Personnel Annual 
Expenditures on Groceries Based on Commissary 
Sales 
Previously, it was determined that $4.3 billion of the 
commissaries' sales were generated in CONUS. This would mean 
that active-duty personnel accounted for approximately $1.46 
billion of the CONUS sales, assuming CBO' s estimate that 
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active-duty account for thirty-four percent of these sales. 
A rough estimate of the annual expenditures per active-duty 
personnel is summarized in Table IV.S. 
Total CONUS Sales $4.3 billion 
Total CONUS Sales by Active- $1.46 billion 
Duty Personnel (34%) 
Active-Duty Personnel 1.15 million 
Stationed in CONUS 
Average Annual Expenditure $1270 
per Active-Duty Member 
Table IV.S. Deter.mination of Per Person Annual Commissary 
Expenditures for Active-Duty Personnel. 
An annual expenditure at the commissaries of $1270 
equates to approximately $106 per month per service-member. 
This value needs to be adjusted to reflect equivalent 
expenditures at commercial supermarkets. This will be done 
by assuming that commissaries provide a twenty percent 
savings compared to commercial supermarkets and active-duty 
members purchase only sixty percent of their commissary-type 
groceries at the commissaries. [Ref.9:p.S] Table IV.6 
summarizes these results. 
Unadjusted Annual Spending $1270 
Adjusted for 20% Commissary $1587.50 (=$1270/0.8) 
Savings 
Adjusted for Only 60% of Purchases $2646 (=$1587.50/0.6) 
Made at Commissaries 
Adjusted Monthly Spending $220 (=$2646/12) 
Table IV.6. Adjusted Expenditures by Active-Duty Per Person. 
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After making these adj ustments to the annual average 
commissary expenditures, active-duty personnel would spend 
approximately $220 per month for grocery items. The 
government's costs based on subsidizing either ten or twenty 
percent of these expenditures for all active-duty personnel 
stationed in CONUS is provided in Table IV.7. 
Ten Percent Subsidy Twenty Percent 
Subsidy 
Government's $304 million $608.5 million 
Subsidization Cost 
Table IV.? Potential Subsidization Costs for all Active-
Duty Personnel Stationed In CONUS based on DeCAls Sales. 
This monthly expenditure for active-duty at the 
commissaries for groceries is significantly lower than the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) indicates in 
its report on the average United States cost of food at 
home. [Ref .11] 
There are two reasons that may explain why this value 
is lower. First ,. this value assumes that all active-duty 
personnel in CONUS shop at the commissaries. Active-duty 
members may be stationed where a commissary is not available 
or they may prefer to forego the commissary's benefit and 
shop at commercial supermarkets. Second, this value is not 
the best estimate of the expected grocery expenditures for 
active-duty personnel at commercial supermarkets due to the 
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difference in products available between commercial 
supermarkets and the commissaries. 
Because of these facts, data provided by the USDA will 
also be used to determine potential annual grocery 
expenditures for active-duty personnel at commercial 
supermarkets. 
3. Estimation of Active-Duty Personnel Expenditures 
on Groceries Based on USDA Data 
Semi-annually, the USDA reports on the average cost of 
food in the United States, according to family 
size. [Ref.9:p.95] The June 1998 data are reproduced in Table 
IV.8. These values are based on the 1977-78 Nationwide Food 
Consumption Survey data and updated to current dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index for specific food items. These data 
assume that all meals and snacks are purchased at stores and 
prepared at home. 
The costs for individuals in Table IV. 8 assume the 
individual is a member of a four-person family. To determine 
the costs for other family sizes, USDA recommends making the 
adjustments indicated in Table IV.9 to the sum of the values 













































20-50 Years 250.30 317.50 
51+ Years 235.00 305.00 
Family of 4: 
Couple,20-50 years and children-
1-2 and 3-5 363.10 456.80 
years 





































Table IV.8. Official USDA Food Plans: Cost of Food at Home 
at Four Levels, U.S. Average, June 1998. 
Family Size Suggested Adjustment 
1-person Add 20 percent 
2-person Add 10 percent 
3-person Add 5 percent 
5- or 6-person Subtract 5 percent 
7- (or more) person Subtract 10 percent 
Table IV.9. Summary of Suggested Adjustments for Other 
Family Sizes. 
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To evaluate the potential costs further, the following 
assumptions were used: 
• The USDA Plan accurately reflects what active-duty 
personnel expenditures at commercial supermarkets 
would be if commissaries were not available. 
• The average family size of all active-duty 
personnel is between one and six people. 
• The average cost for a given family size is 
reasonably estimated based on the average of the 
best case (one child per age group starting with 
1-2 years) and worst case (one child per age group 
starting with 9-11 years) family compositions. 
• The 20-50 year group will be used for all 
calculations. 
• The Liberal-Cost Plan presented by USDA is not 
acceptable for consideration. 
The resultant costs based on these assumptions are 
provided in Table IV.10. 
MONTHLY COST 
Family Size 
Thrifty Low-Cost Moderate 
Plan Plan Plan 
1-person 113.80 144.30 178.10 
2-pe'rson 250.30 317.50 391. 80 
3-person 327.60 414.80 512.30 
4-person 391.10 497.50 615.20 
5-person 466.60 570.00 705.20 
6-person 558.90 706.00 872.70 
Table IV .10. Average Monthly Cost Based on Family Size. 
4. Estimated Subsidization Costs per Family 
The cost to DoD will depend on the percentage discount 
commercial supermarkets will absorb. Commissaries offer a 
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twenty percent discount compared to commercial supermarkets. 
Most likely, DoD would be required to subsidize some portion 
or this entire discount. 
The range of potential monthly costs per person, 
assuming the government's subsidy is between ten and twenty 
percent for all products purchased, can be estimated using 
the information in Table IV.10. These results are summarized 
in Table IV.11. 
Family Thrifty Plan Low-Cost Plan Moderate Plan 
Size 10% 20% 10% 20% 10% 20% 
1-person 11.40 22.80 14.40 28.80 17.80 35.60 
2-person 25.00 50.00 31. 80 63.50 39.20 78.40 
3-person 32.80 65.50 41. 50 83.00 51.20 102.50 
4-person 39.10 78.20 49.80 99.50 61.50 123.00 
5-person 46.70 93.30 57.00 114.00 70.50 141.00 
6-person 55.90 111.80 70.60 141.20 87.30 174.50 
Table IV.ll. Summary of Potential Monthly Subsidy Costs. 
5. Potential Annual Subsidy Costs, Assuming 
Government Subsidizes a Twenty Percent Discount 
Using these results, the government's potential cost to 
provide a twenty percent subsidy for active-duty personnel 
grocery purchases can be determined. These scenarios are 
estimated using: 
• a best case scenario (assuming all active-duty 
families include one person) . 
• a worst case scenario (assuming all active-duty 
families include six people) . 
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• an expected value using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics value of 2.6 people for the average 
family. [Ref.12:p.l] 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics value for the average 
family size was chosen because it is more conservative than 
the average active-duty family size over the last three 
years from data collected by the Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (DIOR). Table IV. 12 provides the 
average f'amily size for active-duty personnel over the last 
three years. [Ref.ll] 
Year 1995 1996 1997 
Average Family Size 2.30 1. 88 2.53 
Table IV.12. Average Family Size of Active~Duty Personnel, 
1995-97. 
The expected value costs, based on 2.6 representing the 
average family size, were calculated by taking a weighted 
average; the potential subsidy cost for a two-person family 
was weighted by a factor of 0.4 and the cost for a three-
person family was weighted by a factor of 0.6. The results 
of these calculations are summarized in Table IV.13. 
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SCENARIO Thrifty Plan Low-Cost Plan Moderate Plan 
Best Case $314.6 million $397.4 million $491.3 million 
Expected $818.3 million $1037.8 million $1281.5 million 
Value 
Worst $1542.8 million $1948.6 million $2408.1 million 
Case 
Table IV.13. Potential Annual Subsidy Costs at Twenty 
Percent. 
The value from the Best Case scenario exceeds the 
current commissary funding attributable to active-duty 
personnel ($225 million). Therefore, it appears that it 
would be too costly for the government to subsidize a full 
twenty percent discount for all of the eligible service-
members. 
6. Potential Subsidy Costs, Assuming Government 
Subsidizes a Ten Percent Discount 
Since subsidizing the full twenty percent discount 
appears to be infeasible, the potential costs of subsidizing 
a ten percent discount will be examined. The calculations 
were made as before. The results of these calculations are 
summarized in Table IV .14. These values are closer to the 
funding available, but only the values from the Best Case 
scenario are under the $225 million in commissary 
appropriations attributable to active-duty personnel in 
CONUS. 
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SCENARIO Thrifty Plan Low-Cost Plan Moderate Plan 
Best Case $157.3 million $198.7 million $245.6 million 
Expected $409.6 million $519.2 million $640.3 million 
Value 
Worst $771. 4 million $974.3 million $1204.7 million 
Case 
Table IV.14. Potential Annual Subsidy Costs at Ten Percent. 
All costs were calculated assuming that DoD adopts a 
policy that allows the subsidy to apply to all items 
available at commercial supermarkets. Adopting policies to 
limit products, eligibility, and/or total savings would 
reduce the costs. Such limitations would occur under a 
policy of "selective subsidization". Quantifying the effects 
of selective subsidization depends entirely on the specifics 
of any selective subsidization policy adopted; and such 
specifics are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
7. Potential Percentage that the Government Could 
Subsidize 
The earlier analysis has shown that it appears 
infeasible for the government to subsidize twenty or even 
ten percent of the grocery purchases at commercial 
supermarkets. This section will determine the percentage 
that the government could potentially subsidize using the 
current commissary appropriations attributable to active 
duty personnel. 
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The potential subsidy will be determined for the 
average family (Expected Value) scenario along with the 
expected expenditures based on DeCA's sales to active-duty. 
The potential subsidy percentage is the expected value of 
annual expenditures divided into the funding available 
(approximately $225 million) . 
If a policy is adopted allowing only active-duty 
personnel to purchase subsidized groceries, this would 
increase the funding available to $660 million. The results 
are summarized in Table IV.15. 
Thrifty Low-Cost Moderate DeCA Sales 
Plan Plan Plan 
Expected 
Value of $4.09 $5.19 $6.40 $3.04 









16.1% 12.7% 10.3% 21. 7% Allowable-
Active-Duty 
Only 
Table IV.1S. Allowable Subsidy Percentage Based on Expected 
Annual Expenditures by Active-Duty Personnel. 
These results imply that the government could subsidize 
approximately a five percent discount, if the discount was 
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applicable to all service-members and expenditures were at 
the USDA levels, before it would incur increased costs. This 
means that commercial supermarkets would need to absorb 
approximately a fifteen percent discount or more to retain 
the same net financial benefit for service-members. Figure 
4.2 illustrates the effect average family size would have on 
the government's potential allowable subsidy based on 











Family Size (in people) 
......- Thrifty Plan 
-II- Low-Cost Plan 
-.- Moderate Plan 
Figure 4.2. Plot of Government1s Allowable Subsidy versus 
Family Size for All Eligible Service-Members. 
However, if the discount was only available to active-
duty personnel, commercial supermarkets would only need to 
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offer approximately a nine percent discount or less to 
retain the same benefits for service-members. Figure 4.3 
illustrates the contrast in the government's allowable 
subsidy if policies are adopted to apply the discount to 
active-duty personnel only. 
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Figure 4.3. Plot of Government's Allowable Subsidy versus 
Family Size for Active-Duty Only. 
In contrast, if the adjusted grocery expenditures based 
on DeCA I s sales accurately reflect active-duty personnel 
purchasing habits at commercial supermarkets, the government 
could subsidize approximately a seven percent discount. This 
would most likely be a best case estimate, since the 
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expenditures do not capture the total expected expenditures 
for the reasons given earlier. 
D. POTENTIAL TRACKING METHODS 
Developing a method to provide, record, and track 
savings by service-member and across DoD is essential to the 
success of this alternative. The Pilot Project at NAB 
Pascagoula intended to provide these capabilities using the 
Navy's Smart Card. [Ref. 14 : p . 4] However, the Navy's Smart 
Card is not developed yet. In the interim, the following 
methods were considered to provide these capabilities: 
• ID cards with embedded bar code discount 
percentages which can be scanned at the register, 
• ID coupons with similar bar code data, or 
• debit or ATM cards with bar code data. 
Another alternative would be to utilize the existing "Smart 
Card" technology available at some commercial supermarkets 
by outsourcing this function. The technology is already 
developed and it should be readily adaptable to meet DoD's 
needs. 
1. Commercial Supermarket Technology 
The grocery industry has been revolutionized since the 
institution of bar codes. Today's computer technology has 
allowed the industry to improve the service it provides. 
Cash registers have been replaced with sophisticated point-
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of-sale terminals. These terminals are scanning systems that 
calculate purchase totals and track product quantities to 
ensure perpetual inventory. Some stores are also testing 
handheld scanners that allow shoppers to tally items while 
they shop. Many retailers use electronic benefit transfer 
(EBT) systems to process government benefits, including food 
stamps, and help combat welfare check fraud. Supermarkets 
also use an electronic coupon system that generates coupons 
based on an individual's purchases. This type of electronic 
information helps the store and its market researchers 
create a database tracking the goods a particular person 
purchases. 
2. Commercial Super.market Smart Card 
The use of "smart cards" at supermarkets provides the 
customer with convenience and the store with an instant 
database. The use of "preferred customer" cards, at stores 
like Safeway and Lucky, automatically deducts "clipless 
coupons" from the bill. This provides the customer the 
convenience of not having to cut coupons to receive the 
savings on the goods they purchase. These "Smart Cards" also 
provide the customer the following information on their 
receipt: 
• Original total purchase price 
• Total savings on these items 
• Total purchases this period 
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• Total savings this period 
This information can be important to the customer. Many 
stores offer five or ten percent discounts along with 
seasonal gifts (e.g. complete Thanksgiving turkey dinners) 
when the customer's total purchases for a given period 
reaches a predetermined amount. 
More importantly to the store, it provides them a 
database that tracks each individual's purchasing habits and 
automatically discounts the appropriate goods. This reduces 
checkout line waiting times. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has analyzed the potential funding and 
costs this alternative could require. Potential policy 
requirements to help limit costs, such as selective 
subsidization, were discussed. Commercial supermarket "Smart 
Card" technology was also discussed. This technology 
provides the capabilities to administer this alternative. 
Chapter V addresses potential advantages and 
disadvantages implementing this alternative will have over 
maintaining the status quo of DoD providing commissaries in 
CONUS. DeCA's justifications for keeping commissaries will 
be discussed as well. 
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V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
This chapter examines several potential advantages and 
disadvantages of replacing the CONUS commissaries with 
discounts through commercial supermarkets. Each point will 
be discussed briefly. The rational DeCA has used to justify 
maintaining the commissary system will also be discussed. 
The information provided here is not an all-inclusive list, 
but illustrates the constant controversy over the commissary 
system. 
A. ADVANTAGES 
1. Allows DoD to Focus More on Core Mission 
DoD is attempting to reduce its infrastructure by 
privatizing or outsourcing functions that can be performed 
more efficiently by commercial sources. DoD is also trying 
to refocus on its core mission as a warfighting 
organization. This alternative would allow DoD to focus more 
on its core mission rather than running a chain of grocery 
stores in CONUS. Eliminating CONUS commissaries would reduce 
the current system from 298 commissaries down to 
approximately 100. These commissaries would only be located 
overseas or at isolated bases in the United States. 
This shift would return the commissary system back to 
providing convenient and reasonably priced goods for its on-
base communities where other alternatives are not readily 
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available. Shifting back to the commissaries' basic 
principle could also eliminate the constant debate over 
their continued operation. Few argue the necessity of the 
overseas commissaries where "essential" items are expensive 
and not readily available elsewhere. 
Maintaining commissaries at isolated bases in CONUS 
would most likely be the most cost effective alternative for 
DoD in those areas. It is unlikely a commercial supermarket 
chain or contractor would be willing to provide their 
services in remote areas within the United States. The 
limited customer base at these locations would reduce the 
profitability of taking over the commissaries at these 
locations. 
2. Accessibility and Choice 
This alternative will provide increased accessibility 
and more choices to the eligible service-members. As 
discussed in Chapter III, commercial supermarkets offer 
extended operating hours and more conveniences. Most 
commissaries are normally open only six days a week for 
seven to eight hours a day. In contrast, commercial 
supermarkets are normally open seven days a week, including 
holidays, and between sixteen and twenty-four hours a day. 
The fact that active-duty personnel are the only ones 
who live on military bases, while comprising a relatively 
small portion of the total eligible patron population, makes 
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off-base grocery shopping more convenient for the larger 
portion of eligible service-members. 
Providing discounts at a variety of stores in a given 
area would provide eligible service-members flexibility to 
shop at the stores and for the brands they prefer. 
B. DISADVANTAGES 
1. Limits on Total Subsidization 
In order to limit the government's liabilities to 
subsidize the savings for eligible service-members, some 
type of regulatory policy would have to be developed. This 
thesis described the concept of selective subsidization that 
would limit the products and amount of savings that would be 
allowed. Limitations on either products that can be 
purchased at a discount and/or the total amount service-
members can save each month or year could reduce the 
service-members' acceptance of this alternative. 
2. Fluctuating Costs 
Since this al ternati ve would provide' government 
subsidized savings to service-members, the total costs would 
need to be determined prior to developing the federal 
budget. Even if policies were adopted to limit the total 
subsidy available, the costs to the government would vary as 
the total number of eligible service-members changed. Cost 
would also vary as a result of variable purchasing behavior 
by individuals, even within a fixed set of participants. As 
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time progresses and data are collected, estimation models 
could be developed to accurately predict potential costs. 
3. Redistribution of Benefits 
If limitations are placed on the total subsidy 
available to eligible service-members, this alternative 
would redistribute the benefits from service-members who 
purchase the majority of their groceries at the commissaries 
to service-members who already make their grocery purchases 
at commercial supermarkets. This redistribution would most 
likely have a larger effect on the lower income service-
members, junior enlisted and retirees, as their benefits 
would decrease. 
C. DECA I S RATIONALE 
This is not the first time alternatives to the 
commissaries have been proposed. DeCA continues to expound 
the virtues and the "whys" of keeping the commissaries. The 
most obvious reason DeCA gives is that the overseas 
commissaries provide Americans stationed in foreign 
countries with American products at affordable 
prices. [Ref.15:p.5] 
DeCA goes on to provide many other reasons for keeping 
the commissaries, including: [Ref.15:p.5] 
• Commissaries are a vital part of the total 
compensation package necessary to maintaining an 
all-volunteer force. 
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• Commissaries encourage people to re-enlist, 
preserving a well trained, dedicated military. 
• Commissaries encourage spouses to favor re-
enlistment. 
• The u.s. government cannot afford to break faith 
with its military retirees who were promised this 
form of non-pay compensation upon enlisting, 
especially at a time when other retiree benefits 
are already being eroded. 
• In Congressional testimony and customer surveys, 
enlisted families have said repeatedly that the 
commissaries, stateside as well as overseas, are 
essential to morale, especially when a change of 
duty station necessitates a family move. 
Each of the reasons presented by DeCA has a ring of 
truth to it, depending upon your viewpoint. It must be 
understood that it is not in DeCA's interest to voluntarily 
admit there is an acceptable alternative to the 
commissaries. The benefits of the overseas commissaries are 
not disputed here; however, DeCA's other justifications can 
be rebutted fairly easily. 
In regards to preserving the compensation package, 
encouraging re-enlistment, and maintaining morale, the 
essential factor likely is discounted groceries, not the 
commissary in particular. DeCA bases these justifications on 
survey responses and Congressional testimony. However, the 
wording of the questions is instrumental in the way they are 
answered. As long as the service-members perceive they are 
receiving the same benefit, whether via the commissary or 
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via discounts at commercial supermarkets, 
indifferent between commissaries and 
described in this thesis. 
they should be 
the alternative 
As far as breaking faith with retirees, the alternative 
of purchasing goods at commercial stores at a di.scount would 
provide them more convenience and flexibility. The added 
convenience of greater accessibility and product selection 
available at commercial supermarkets, compared to the 
commissaries, may justify a lower discount. To realize the 
commissary's benefits, retirees are forced to live near 
military bases or take periodic long trips to the 
commissary. Providing these discounts 
stores, especially supermarket chains, 
retiree a larger selection of goods 
at a variety of 
would provide the 
and the increased 
convenience of accessibility, location and operating hours. 
Of course this all depends on the supermarket discount 
program's ability to provide the same utility as the 
commissaries at a savings to the government. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter considered several advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed alternative. The reasons DeCA 
gives for keeping the commissaries and counterpoints were 
discussed. 
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Chapter VI will provide conclusions and recommendations 





Chapter IV examined the available funding and potential 
costs if the government subsidized discounts at commercial 
supermarkets. This chapter will look back at the original 
thesis objectives to provide recommendations from this 
research. Areas requiring further research will also be 
discussed. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
This thesis evaluated the feasibility of the government 
subsidizing commercial supermarkets to provide discounts to 
eligible service-members. This was accomplished by the 
following methods: 
• Examining the willingness of commercial 
supermarkets to offer this type of service. 
The pilot project at the Naval Station Pascagoula was 
used to establish that, given certain circumstances, 
commercial supermarkets would be willing to provide service-
members discounts. Al though the amount of the discount in 
the pilot project was only five or six percent, these stores 
required no subsidy from the government. 
• Evaluating the applicability of current "Smart 
Card" technology in use at commercial supermarkets. 
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The pilot project at the Naval Station Pascagoula 
envisioned using the Navy's Smart Card as the means to 
administer their program. The Navy's Smart Card is not in 
place as of yet; however, commercial supermarkets, such as 
Lucky and Safeway, already employ "preferred customer" cards 
which utilize the necessary technology to administer this 
type of program. DoD should evaluate outsourcing this 
function to the "Smart Card" systems already in use as an 
alternative to developing its own. 
• Analyzing methods to control the amount of 
subsidization. 
To control or limit potential subsidization costs, DoDO 
could use policies such as selective subsidization or 
reduced discounts at commercial supermarkets. Neither 
alternative would be appealing to the service-members that 
currently use the commissaries; however, these limits may be 
necessary to prevent excessive government subsidies, 
especially due to the increased benefit this alternative 
would provide service-members who do not currently utilize 
commissaries for their grocery purchases. 
• Comparing estimated costs to current 
appropriations. 
The potential costs were estimated utilizing the USDA's 
data on the cost of food at home as of June 1998. These data 
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were evaluated using a worst, most likely, and best case 
scenario approach. The portion of the current appropriations 
that supports CONUS commissaries was estimated using values 
presented in the CBO Report. This estimated portion was used 
to determine the maximum amount of subsidization the 
government could provide for this alternative. 
Using the results of these analyses and USDA food 
plans, it was determined that the government could subsidize 
approximately three to five percent of the discount for all 
eligible service-members without increasing funding. 
However, if DoD adopted a policy to limit the discount to 
active-duty personnel only, the government could subsidize 
between ten and sixteen percent, based on USDA data. 
In contrast, if providing a discount at commercial 
supermarkets does not change active-duty personnel spending 
habits, based on current DeCA sales figures the government 
could subsidize approximately seven percent discount for all 
eligible service-members. If this discount was limited to 
active-duty personnel only, the government could subsidize a 
twenty-one percent discount. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
OMB Circular Number A-76 states, 
In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its 
citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual 
freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national economic 
strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be 
the general policy of the Government to rely on commercial sources to 
supply the products and services the Government needs. 
America's National Security Strategy echoes this 
message by stating, 
DoD should concentrate on its core missions, outsourcing activities that 
can be performed more efficiently in the private sector, and reengineer 
support activities that remain in the government. 
Faced with limited budgetary resources, DoD should make 
every attempt to reduce its costs by reducing its 
infrastructure. DoD can achieve this reduction in 
infrastructure by focusing on its core mission. Eliminating 
the infrastructure necessary to operate CONUS commissaries 
would be a step in that direction. 
To make this alternative more appealing, it is 
necessary to minimize the government's subsidization 
requirements. One method to accomplish this is via contract 
negotiations. Another method would be to reduce the size of 
the discount necessary to provide the same benefit by 
increasing the range of products that could be purchased at 
a discount. 
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The growth of the commercial grocery industry along 
with advances in technology makes it convenient and possible 
for authorized commissary patrons to purchase their goods at 
the local supermarket and have a predetermined discount 
deducted from their purchase. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis was only intended to evaluate the 
feasibility of this alternative based on a broad scope 
approach. Further detailed analysis in the following areas 
would be required to substantiate this alternative: 
• determining more precisely the savings (costs not 
incurred) by eliminating DeCA's CONUS commissaries 
while maintaining commissaries at isolated bases 
and overseas. 
• quantifying (in dollars) the utility commissaries 
provide eligible service-members. 
• determining the actual savings commissaries provide 
service-members when compared to commercial 
supermarkets. 
• determining the percent savings supermarkets would 
have to offer to maintain service~members' utility. 
• determining the cost of contracting with grocery 
stores throughout the country to provide this 
service. 
• determining the percent savings supermarkets would 
provide without requiring recourse from the 
government. 
• determining the effect on cost of including all 
eligible service-members. 
• determining the cost and utility of alternative 
selective subsidization policies. 
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All of these areas would need further research to 
determine if this alternative could provide the best service 
at the best price for eligible service-members. The 
commissary's benefit is a high-value quality-of-life issue. 
Any changes to the current system would require thorough 
analysis to ensure that the utility commissaries provide is 
maintained, while reducing the costs to the taxpayers. 
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